UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Alexandria Division
ALEXANDRE P. KONANYKHINE
Clarke-Frederick-Winchester Regional Adult Detention Center
141 Fort Collier Rd. Winchester, VA 22603
pro se, detained, indigent
Petitioner
v.
WILLIAM J. CARROLL
Immigration and Naturalization Service District Director, Washington District Office
4420 N. Fairfax Drive, Room 510, Arlington, VA 22203
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR PROSECUTORIAL INQUIRY
I. ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MURDER
1. Lt. Colonel Volevodz of Russian Military Procuracy is acting on behalf of the organized criminal group which has been seeking assassination of Petitioner since 1992. The illegal military “investigation” of false claims made by this organized criminal group was initiated by Volevodz with the purpose to locate Petitioner and his wife to facilitate their murder by the Mafia.
2. Throughout his attempts to illegally extradite Petitioner to Russia Respondent was perfectly aware that such extradition will result in imminent death of Petitioner. Indeed, as Respondent was well informed, the FBI had established that the life of Petitioner was in extreme danger even in the U.S.A. because of the persecution by the Russian Mafia. Respondent could not possibly avoid the conclusion that in Russia, where the Mafia has unlimited power, Petitioner will be murdered and thus unlawful extradition or deportation of Petitioner to Russia would result in sure death of Petitioner.
3. Unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought constitutes murder. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111. The Petition demonstrates that Respondent’s and District Counsel’s actions, which, if succeeded, would result in killing of Petitioner, were unlawful and with malice aforethought.
4. Indeed, Respondent and District Counsel resorted to fraud upon the United States and on the Court, use of perjured testimony, tampering with witnesses and retaliating against witnesses, false arrests and imprisonment and other similarly unlawful devices to assist the Mafia in murder of Petitioner. Respondent and District Counsel knowingly committed these actions, understanding that they, if succeeded, would result in death of Petitioner, and Respondent and District Counsel acted because of self-interest (to get publicity, to make a favor to other officials, to cover up their previous violations of law, etc.), i.e. they acted with “malice aforethought”.
5. Thus, Respondent and District Counsel attempted to commit an unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, which, according to 18 U.S.C. § 1111 and 18 U.S.C. § 1113, constituted attempt to commit murder, punishable with imprisonment for 20 years or fine or both under 18 U.S.C. § 1113.
II. DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
1. Acting unlawfully and for inappropriate purpose, Respondent and his agents under color of immigration law willfully deprived Petitioner of important rights, protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, including:
1.1. Right for liberty, protected by the Constitution of the United States - by false arrest* and imprisonment.
*When an officer, knowing a warrant to be illegal, groundless or fictitious willfully uses his authority and/or such instrument to arrest and incarcerate an accused, such action is a deprivation of the right of the accused to liberty and a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 242] and neither threat nor violence is a necessary ingredient of the offense under such circumstances. U.S. v. Ramey, C.A.W.Va 1964, 336 F.2d 512, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 649, 379 U.S. 972, 13 L.Ed.2d. 564. An arrest by a state officer in furtherance of his political ambitions was a violation of [18 U.S.C. § 242] where arresting officer knew the crime was fictitious and the warrant fictitious. Id.
1.2. Right for good reputation, which is a liberty right protected by the Constitution of the United States* - by distribution of false, libelous and defamatory statements, false publications, malicious prosecution and false imprisonment.
*One’s reputation or good name is an element of liberty protected by this [5th] amendment [to the Constitution of the United States]. Casey v. Roudebush, D.C.Md. 1975, 395 F.Supp. 60.
1.3. Right to be protected from unlawful search, protected by the Constitution of the United States - by unlawful search.
1.4. Property rights, protected by the Constitution of the United States - by illegal seizure.
1.5. Right for due process of law, protected by the Constitution of the United States - by numerous violations of due process as set forth in the Petition.
1.6. Respondent also intended to deprive Petitioner of life, the right to which is protected by the Constitution of the United States - by conspiracy to commit illegal extradition on behalf of the Russian Mafia*.
*Suspected criminality furnish no license for destruction of guaranteed constitutional rights. Miller v. U.S. , C.A.La. 1968, 404 F.2d. 611.
According to 18 U.S.C. § 242* willful deprivation of rights of any inhabitant** of the United States under color of law, statute, ordinance, regulation is an offense.
*This section prohibiting anyone, under color of any law, from willfully depriving inhabitant of state of any right protected by Constitution or laws of the United States. U.S. v. Cooney, D.C.Colo. 1963, 217 Fed.Supp. 417.
**In context of this section [18 U.S.C. § 242] the word “inhabitant” describes any person who is within jurisdiction of the United States. U.S. v. Otherson, D.C.Cal 1979, 480 F.Supp 1369.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 242. Deprivation of rights under color of law.
Whoever, under color of any low, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, then are prescribed for punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if death results shall be subject to imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
Prisoner could not properly personally institute criminal proceeding against state and its officers for violations of his rights under color of law and any such complaint should have been sent to U.S. attorney. Dixon v. State of Md. by Carter, D.C.Md. 1966, 261 F.Supp 764.
A state law enforcement officer who, under color of state law, willfully, without cause arrested or imprisoned an inhabitant thereby committed an offense under former section 52 of this Title [8]. U.S. v. Trierweiler, D.C.Ill. 1943, 52 F.Supp 4.
III. TAMPERING WITH WITNESSES; RETALIATING AGAINST WITNESSES; CONSPIRACY TO KILL, MAIM, OR INJURE PERSONS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY
1. When urgent intervention of Petitioner’s attorneys forced Respondent to allow Petitioner hearing before an Immigration Judge, Respondent faced the risk that during such a hearing it might be established that the arrest of Petitioner was unlawful and made for an inappropriate reason.
2. Especially uncomfortable for Respondent were witnesses Mr. Menchukov and Mr. Uryvaev, who, to the knowledge of Respondent, intended to testify to the corrupt and unlawful character of Respondent’s associate, one Lt. Colonel Volevodz, and to the fraudulent character of the evidence on which Respondent’s charges were built.
3. To prevent these testimonies and to retaliate against the witnesses Respondent conspired with Lt. Colonel Volevodz and District Counsel Rosas to kill, maim, or injure the witnesses or witnesses’ relatives in Russia.
4. The facts show that Respondent and District Counsel Rosas related to Lt. Colonel Volevodz names of witnesses and information that the witnesses were going to testify to the Volevodz’s association with the Mafia. Not only that, Respondent and District Counsel specifically requested Lt. Colonel Volevodz to “take care of things”, i.e. to contact the witnesses, interrogate them about his own affiliation with the Mafia and corrupt practices, and to arrange “evidence” against them. Not only that, Respondent and District Counsel specifically prohibited INS officers stationed in Moscow to conduct the immigration investigation themselves, as the law and the practice required.
5. Respondent and District Counsel knew that allegations about Lt. Colonel Volevodz being a major Mafia executive were well grounded. Indeed, Petitioner had demonstrated to them that (a) Volevodz had submitted to the INS and Department of Justice fabricated and “doctored” documents and fraudulent statements; (b) Volevodz’ persecution of Petitioner was unlawful; (c) Russian law enforcement agencies are notoriously corrupt; (d) Volevodz was acting on behalf of the organized criminal group which had kidnapped Petitioner and seized his companies; (e) the story which Volevodz had told Respondent was untrue. In fact, Volevodz activity was so unlawful that in 1995 the Department of Justice strongly “advised [Petitioner] not to reveal his whereabouts to anyone connected to the Russian investigation” conducted by Volevodz. Respondent and District Counsel could not possibly avoid the conclusion that Petitioner’s statements that Volevodz was in fact a Mafia enforcer very well could be true.
6. Respondent and District Counsel knew that Volevodz was a Mafia enforcer. Should Respondent and District Counsel had any doubt about that, they would have made diligent effort to investigate Petitioner’s allegations and evidence of such association, which they did not do.
7. Forwarding to the Mafia the names of witnesses about to testify against the Mafia could have been done only with the purpose to have these witnesses or their relatives killed, maimed or injured; thus, Respondent and District Counsel committed an act within the jurisdiction of the U.S. to effect the object of the conspiracy by relaying confidential information to the Mafia.
8. Volevodz acted to effect object of the conspiracy of Respondent, District Counsel and himself. He contacted witnesses and their relatives and intimidated them, as set forth in the Petition. In this way he obtained testimonies, required for the criminal conspiracy of Respondent and Volevodz to commit an illegal extradition of Petitioner, from all witnesses in Moscow and extremely intimidated the witnesses of Russian origin in the United States. In fact, because of that intimidation one of them, Mr. Kulkov, refused to testify voluntarily, and had to be subpoenaed.
9. However, Mr. Menchukov, though very intimidated, did testify about the Mafia association and corrupt practices of Volevodz.
10. As an apparent retaliation for Mr. Menchukov’s testimony, in February 1997 brother-in-law of Mr. Menchukov, whom Volevodz had contacted prior to Mr. Menchukov’s testimony to intimidate and thus prevent Mr. Menchukov from testifying, was ambushed by a Mafia assassin, who emptied in him a gun. Only miraculously, because the gun jammed, the relative of Mr. Menchukov and his wife, who was with him, survived. Mr. Menchukov’s brother-in-law was wounded twice and taken to the hospital.
11. The conspiracy of Respondent and District Counsel to have the formidable and ruthless Russian Mafia to deal with anti-Mafia witnesses in a Mafia way constituted a “conspiracy to kill, maim, or injure persons in a foreign country”, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 956, which is punishable by imprisonment for up to life.
IV. RACKETEERING
As the Petition and evidence demonstrate, the persecution of Petitioner by Lt. Colonel Volevodz, Respondent, some other Respondent’s employees, and the Russian Mafia assassins was organized partly for financial gains - for protection of the assets the organized criminal group robbed Petitioner of.
Petitioner has no documentary proof that executors of the persecution, namely Lt. Colonel Volevodz, Respondent, some other Respondent’s employees, and the Russian Mafia assassins, are paid for said persecution, though it is obvious that Mafia normally pays or otherwise motivates its hitmen and other enforcers. The important fact is that the persecution conspiracy in which Volevodz, Respondent, and some of Respondent’s agents participate is undertaken partly for financial gains. As a part of this persecution Respondent and some of his employees committed acts indictable under sections 1512 and 1513 of Title 18 U.S. Code.
According to 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B): “… any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, U.S. Code: … section 1512, … section 1513 … if the act was committed for the purpose of financial gain” constitute “racketeering activity”.
V. CONCLUSION
Therefore, Petitioner respectfully requests the Honorable Court to grant his Motion for Prosecutorial Inquiry.
Respectfully submitted
Alexandre Konanykhine
Dated: April 19, 1997